AgentProv
← All incidents
2026-10-07 · 2026-Q4

Langflow Advisory Batch: Arbitrary Commands in MCP stdio Server Configs, PythonREPL to Superuser, and Cross-User MCP Resource Reads (CVE-2026-105697)

PrimaryL5ConfigSecondaryL6Identity / Run
Fixable:
Yes, vendor patch
Vendor response:
Patched
In the wild:
No
Actor:
Attacker

Target

Langflow (`langflow`, `langflow-base`, `lfx` on PyPI)

Impact

Langflow published a set of advisories on October 5-7, 2026. Any user able to add an MCP server or build a flow with the MCP Tools component could set an arbitrary stdio command, run through `bash -c` as the Langflow user as soon as Langflow connects, even when the UI shows a failure; with the default `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true` no account is needed (CVE-2026-105697, affects 1.1.2 to before 1.10.3). `PythonREPLComponent` left `__builtins__` unrestricted, giving authenticated users RCE and the ability to set `is_superuser` (CVE-2026-10561, fixed in 1.10.1). Project-scoped MCP `resources/read` never checked flow ownership, letting one user read another's files (CVE-2026-105699, 1.6.8 to 1.9.0, fixed in 1.9.1). Single source (GitHub advisories and NVD)

Root Cause

MCP server definitions are treated as trusted executables that any flow author can supply, and MCP resource handlers are not scoped to the caller

View this entry in the catalog