"JADEPUFFER" First Documented End-to-End Agentic Ransomware

An internet-facing Langflow instance used for initial access, then a production database environment (MySQL and the Alibaba Nacos configuration service)

Sysdig documented what it calls the first extortion operation run end to end by an autonomous LLM agent: recon, credential theft, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistence, culminating in the encryption of 1,342 Nacos service-configuration items before the originals were deleted. The agent self-narrated, adapted in real time (a failed login diagnosed and fixed in 31 seconds), and swept for LLM API keys and cloud credentials; the encryption key was generated randomly and never stored, making recovery impossible

Initial access via the older Langflow unauthenticated code-execution flaw CVE-2025-3248, with Nacos reached through auth-bypass CVE-2021-29441; the novelty is the fully agent-driven operation rather than a new vulnerability