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AgentProv

2026-05-04 · 2026-Q2

Grok and Bankr AI Wallet Drained via Morse-Code Prompt Injection

Primary layerL2 InstructionSecondary:L6 Identity / Run

Who actually said "do this"?

The question layer 2 asks, and failed here.
Fixable
Architectural
Vendor response
Unknown
In the wild
Yes
Actor
Attacker

Target

xAI's Grok integrated with the Bankr crypto trading agent on the Base network

Impact

Roughly $174,000 to $204,000 in DRB (DebtReliefBot) tokens transferred to an attacker, with about 80 to 88 percent later returned through negotiation

Root cause

A two-stage permission-chain abuse: the attacker first unlocked a high-privilege agent toolset by activating a "Bankr Club Membership," then sent Grok a Morse-code message asking it to translate; once Grok output the decoded plaintext transfer instruction and tagged the trading bot, the bot treated the public reply as a valid executable command with no source validation

Sources

Catalog

Cite this: AgentProv incident record: Grok and Bankr AI Wallet Drained via Morse-Code Prompt Injection (2026-05-04). https://agentprov.com/incidents/2026-05-04-grok-and-bankr-ai-wallet-drained-via-morse-code-prompt-injection