2026-04-15 · 2026-Q2
Copilot Studio ShareLeak and Agentforce PipeLeak Form-Based Prompt Injection
PrimaryL2InstructionSecondaryL8Output / Destination
- Fixable:
- Yes, vendor patch
- Vendor response:
- Patched
- In the wild:
- No
- Actor:
- Attacker
Target
Microsoft Copilot Studio and Salesforce Agentforce
Impact
Attackers fill public-facing SharePoint or Web-to-Lead form fields with a fake system-role payload; hijacked agents query connected data sources in bulk and email the results to an attacker address with no volume cap, no Human-in-the-Loop prompt, and no trace shown to the employee who triggered the agent; Capsule Security reports the email channel remains exploitable on Agentforce Sub-Agents (formerly Custom Topics) even after Salesforce's remediation
Root Cause
Untrusted form inputs concatenated directly into agent context windows; agents simultaneously hold read access to CRM/SharePoint data and authority to send outbound email